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Vanna White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
971 F.2D 1395 (9TH CIR. 1992).
Introduction
Vanna White, hostess of the famous television game show "Wheel of For-
tune", sued Samsung Electronics America ("Samsung") and David Deutsch Asso-
ciates, Inc. ("Deutsch") for running a particular advertisement that appropriated
her identity without her consent. White alleged the ad violated the California
Civil Code, the common-law right of publicity, and the Lanham Act. The United
States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants on each claim. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the ad did not appropriate White's name or
likeness and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the California Civil Code
claim. However, the court also found that issues of material fact existed as to the
right of publicity and Lanham Act claims which precluded a grant of summary
judgment to defendants. Thus, the court remanded the case for a jury determina-
tion of these two issues.
Facts
Vanna White, as a result of the fame the game show "Wheel of Fortune" has
bestowed upon her, has been able to capitalize on this fame by marketing her
identity to various advertisers. Deutsch prepared a series of product advertise-
ments for Samsung, all of which followed a general theme: a current item from
popular culture was depicted with a Samsung product and conveyed the message
that the Samsung product would still be in use in the twenty-first century. The
series of ads ran in several publications that were widely circulated, in some
instances nationally.
The current dispute was prompted by Samsung's advertisement for its video-
cassette recorders. The ad at issue portrayed a robot dressed in a blonde wig,
long gown, and large jewelry meant to depict White's appearance. The robot was
pictured standing next to a game board identical to that in the "Wheel of For-
tune" set, in a pose for which White is famous. The caption in the ad read:
"Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D." Defendants even referred to the ad as
the "Vanna White" ad. This advertisement was circulated without Whites' con-
sent and she was not paid for the use of her likeness as were some other celeb-
rities whose identities were used in other ads in the series. White sued Deutsch
and Samsung for violation of section 3344 of the California Civil code, the com-
mon-law right of publicity, and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The district
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgement on each claim, and this
appeal followed.
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Legal Analysis
The first issue addressed by the Court of Appeals was whether the district
court erred in rejecting White's claim that the Samsung ad used her likeness in
contravention of section 3344 of the California Civil Code. In Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., the court defined the term "likeness" to mean a visual image.'
Applying this definition to the case at bar, the court concluded that since the
robot used by Samsung had mechanical features and was not a replica of White's
precise features, it was not White's likeness within the meaning of section 3344.
Thus, the district court's dismissal of this claim was affirmed.
The court next addressed the issue of whether the district court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment to defendants on White's common-law right of publicity
claim. A cause of action for the right of publicity may be pleaded by alleging the
following: (1) defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) appropriation of
plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting injury.2 The district court reasoned since there was no appropriation of
White's name or likeness in the robot ad, White failed to satisfy the second
prong of the test which warranted dismissal of her claim.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's view that the right of
publicity is limited to the appropriation of name or likeness. In Motschenbacher
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a valid right of publicity action existed where
defendant used plaintiff's race car in a television commercial, even though
plaintiff's features were not visible in the photograph? Also, in Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., it was held that defendants appropriated part of plaintiff Bette Mid-
ler's identity by using a Midler sound-alike to sing a song which Midler made
famous.4 Finally, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Johnny Carson's
identity was appropriated when defendant used Carson's signature phrase "Here's
Johnny" as a brand name under which he marketed his portable toilets.5 Based
on the foregoing cases, the court here concluded that the common-law right of
publicity reaches means of appropriation other than name or likeness and that it
is not the means of appropriation of a plaintiffs identity that is important, but
whether the defendant has appropriated at all. The court also noted that "the
identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for
advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such
as name, likeness, or voice."
Moreover, the court recognized that in cases of appropriation of a celebrity
plaintiff's identity by means other than name or likeness, those actions directly
implicate commercial interests which the right of publicity is designed to protect.
The court in Carson, explaining the theory of the right of publicity, stated that
since a celebrity's identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, the
1. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d 198, Cal.Rptr.342 (1983).
3. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
4. Id. at 463-64.
5. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 835-37 (6th Cir. 1983).
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celebrity has a protectable interest against unauthorized commercial exploitation
of his identity.6 Invasion of the right of publicity occurs when such identity is
commercially exploited regardless of whether the celebrity's name or likeness is
used.
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the court found that
viewed together, the aspects of the ad left little doubt as to which celebrity the
ad was trying to depict. The female-shaped robot wearing a blonde wig, long
gown, large jewelry, turning a block letter on a game board immediately recog-
nizable as the "Wheel of Fortune" game show set resembles only one person:
Vanna White. The defendants themselves even referred to the ad as the "Vanna
White" ad. Based on these facts, the court concluded that White has shown there
was appropriation of her identity and therefore the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to defendants on White's right of publicity claim.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether White had a valid claim
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The relevant portion of this section pro-
vides that "any person who shall ... use, in connection with any goods or ser-
vices ... any false description or representation ... shall be liable to a civil
action ... by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by
the use of any such false description or designation."7 In order to prevail, White
must show that in running the robot ad, Samsung and Deutsch created a likeli-
hood of confusion on the part of the public.8 The test applied by the Court of
Appeals in determining whether there was likelihood of confusion was set out in
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats which listed eight relevant factors to be consid-
ered: (1) strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) simi-
larity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels
used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the
mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product.9 The court considered
White's claim in light of each factor.
In cases concerning confusion over celebrity endorsement, "mark" means the
celebrity's persona," and the "strength" of the mark refers to the level of recog-
nition the celebrity enjoys among members of society." If the segment of the
population that the ad targets is unfamiliar with White's persona then that seg-
ment would not be confused as to whether White was endorsing Samsung's
products. However, since White is well-known there is a possibility of a likeli-
hood of confusion among the public, thus White's "mark" is strong.
The next factor, relatedness of the goods, concerns "the reasons for or source
of the plaintiff's fame." The court found that White's "goods" were closely
related to Samsung's VCR's because her fame was based on her television per-
6. Id. at 835.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
8. Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d
1446, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991).
9. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
10. Woody Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
11. Academy, 944 F.2d at 1455.
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formances. Moreover, this relationship was reinforced by the ad itself, which
implied the public would be recording the "longest-running game show" on
Samsung's VCR's.
The court found the third factor, similarity of the marks, not to be determina-
tive since there was ambiguity as to whether likelihood of confusion existed.
Although the robot clearly depicted White, it was still a robot and not a human
figure. The fourth factor, evidence of actual confusion, weighed against White
because she failed to present any evidence of actual confusion.
The fifth factor, marketing channels used, weighed toward a finding of likeli-
hood of confusion. This conclusion is supported by the fact that White has
appeared in numerous magazines and magazine covers pictured in the same
stance as the robot in the disputed ad, and Samsung used magazines as its
marketing channel.
As to the sixth factor, it was determined that consumers were not likely to
exhibit a high degree of purchaser care in determining who endorses VCR's thus
making confusion as to their endorsement more likely.
With regard to the seventh factor, the court was concerned with whether the
defendants intended to profit by confusing consumers concerning the endorse-
ment of Samsung products. The court concluded that looking at the series as a
whole and the theme embodied in each ad, a jury could reasonably conclude that
in addition to creating a spoof of the game show "Wheel of Fortune", the defen-
dants intended to convince consumers that Vanna White endorsed Samsung
products like the celebrities in other Samsung ads.
Finally, the court found the eighth factor, likelihood of expansion of the prod-
uct, irrelevant in cases involving celebrity endorsement. Based on an application
of the Sleekcraft factors to White's Lanham Act claim, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defen-
dants since White had presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning a
likelihood of confusion as to her endorsement of the Samsung ad. The court
noted that of particular importance was the fact that the "Vanna White" robot ad
was part of a series of ads in which other celebrities participated and were paid
for their endorsement of Samsung's products. The court therefore held that the
Lanham Act claim was a matter to be decided by a jury on remand.
Conclusion
White alleged infringement of various intellectual property rights after Sam-
sung ran an ad that appropriated her identity without her consent. The Court of
Appeals concluded that since the robot in Samsung's ad was not a replica of
White's precise features it was not a "likeness" within the meaning of the Cali-
fornia statute. However, the common-law right of publicity reaches means of
appropriation other than name or likeness, thus a robot that so clearly depicts a
particular celebrity has appropriated her identity. Looking at the series of adver-
tisements as a whole, the court concluded that White presented a genuine issue
of material fact as to likelihood of confusion. The court thus remanded the case
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for a jury determination of the validity of White's right of publicity and Lanham
Act claims.
Zorka Ristanovic
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